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INTRODUCTION
According to professor Mathiesen one of the major features, of 
Norwegian society and culture is that Norway "has a long and strong 
social—democratic tradition" in which the state is strongly perceived as 
kind and benevolent and "always doing what is best for the people". 2 
With varying degrees of success all states in the world attempt to 
portray themselves as kind, benevolent and democratic. Most western 
countries have been largely successful in entrenching electoral 
democracy, government accountability and hence have built strong 
cultures of democratic government paying fidelity to the fundamental 
principles of the rule of la w ^  In these countries the culture of 
democracy has been so engraved within the political systems that it 
is often taken" for granted that elections will be free and fair that if
the ruling party loses it will gracefully hand over power to the
victorious party or parties and that the government of the day will 
govern within the bounds of constitutionality and the rule of law.
In Africa and elsewhere in the Third World the scenario is most 
often completely different. Elections, if they are held at all, are
almost always characterized by all forms of intimidation and harass­
ment of political opponents.
The ordinary people suffer the most as they are used, as voting
fodder in elections whfch are more often than not rigged. Where
rigging fails, election results are suspended, sometimes together with
An earlier version of this paper was written for and presented at the Institutt for 
Rettssosiologi, Universitetet i Oslo, Norway, IS. September 1989. I thank professor 
Geof Feltoe and Liz Lapham for their invaluable suggestions and comments, t r f
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what remains of the country's constitution. 3 In some countries basic 
fundamental preconditions of democracy are rejected and substituted 
with crude notions of traditional or ancient democracy which amount 
to a perversion of modem day democracy. The clearest example is 
found in Kenya, where one of the most basic principles of democracy, 
the secret ballot, has been rejected as alien and substituted by a 
crude system of balloting which involves queuing behind one's 
candidate. This primitive "queue—behind your candidate" electoral 
system has been forcefully defended by the Kenyan ruling cliques who 
have indicated their intentions to constitutionally entrench this 
incredible system of "modem day" balloting. 4 5
In Africa the culture of democracy and government accountability is 
conspicuous by its absence. The continent abounds with various 
shades of one-party and/or military dictatorships. Even though these - 
regimes engage in massive acts of brutality, murder, detentions without 
trial and persistent violations of human rights, they still claim to be 
governing of and in the interests of the people.
Together with Botswana, Zimbabwe fyts often been portrayed as an 
exception to this gloomy picture of African politics. This kind of 
portrayal of Zimbabwe is duet to a number of factors which include 
the fact that unlike most African former colonies which inherited 
independence constitutions only to reject them immediately upon 
gaining independence, Zimbabwe has maintained a striking fidelity to 
its independence constitution, only amending it now and again in 
accordance with the terms provided for in the constitution. Strict 
observance of the Lancaster House constitution granted to Zimbabwe 
by the British government in 1979 has'been adhered to despite the 
fact that the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(Patriotic Front), had been vociferously opposed to virtually all the 
major aspects of the constitution. This fidelity has created what
3 This is precisely what chief Lebau Jonathan did when he was Prime Minister of Lesotho 
in 1972.
4
For a fuller dicussion of the perversion of the electoral process in Kenya, see S.B.O. 
Gutto: ’Constitutional Law and Politics in Kenya since Independence: A Study in Class and 
Power in a Neo1-Colonial State in Africa’, Z.L. Rev.. VoL 5, 1987, 142.
5 See 'C onstitution# Constitutionalism and Class’, pp.4-6, unpublished paper written for and 
presented at AAPS/AALS Conference, Harare, May 1988.
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6professor Reg Austin has described as a "myth of constitutionalism".
The retention of the multi-party system as entrenched in the 
Lancaster House constitution, notwithstanding the expressed intentions 
of the ruling party to introduce a one-party political system after the 
expiration of the entrenched clauses of the constitution in April 1990, 
has also contributed to the creation of the "myth of constitutionalism".
There can be no doubt that the sometimes vulgar anti-democratic 
practices and excesses that have characterized most of Africa have as 
yet not featured in Zimbabwe. There have, however, been disturbing 
trends which have tended to suggest that sooner or later the 
Zimbabwean political order will adopt 'lock, stock and barrel" virtually 
all of the repression found in other African countries.
It is the object of this paper to discuss and highlight some of these 
trends with a view to demonstrating that behind the facade of 
"constitutionalism and democracy" which has been created of the 
Zimbabwean state in fact lies a brutal legal system, serious violations 
of basic democratic rights, human rights and the rule of law and 
thence my title description of these trends as "politics of repression1^  
For Zimbabwe to establish a real system of constitutional democracy, y 
a complete renunciation of the politics of repression is needed. {
THE RHODESIAN REPRESSIVE LEGACY
Zimbabwe achieved independence on 18 April, 1980, after a bitter 
liberation war lasting some seven years, and costing a minimum of 
40 000 lives. The war was of such savageness that, for example, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross rebuked both sides for 
their callousness. Before and during the war the Rhodesian state 
built up a brutal legal and political culture — a culture permeated 
from top to bottom with highly repressive legislation enforced and
p. 5.
See David Caute: iim w  the SHn- 
Suffolk, 1983. See also
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applied by a zealous judiciary. The army and police force routinely 
harassed, detained, tortured and sometimes murdered political 
opponents of the racist Rhodesian government. The courts acting 
under the pervasive array of brutal security laws sent to jail thousands 
and thousands of Africans found guilty of violating the oppressive laws 
of Rhodesia.
The construction of a brutal legal and political system by the 
Rhodesian state was systematic and dictated by the ever rising tide 
of African resistance to colonial racist rule. Between 1933 and 1958 
the Huggins and Todd governments flirted with a few security 
measures such as the enactment of the Subversive Activities Act, 1950, 
which, inter alia, allowed the government to ban all activities 
considered subversive. However, it was not until between 1959 and 
1970 that Rhodesia witnessed the introduction of drastic and repressive 
legislation such as the Vagrancy Act. Chapter 92. which empowered 
the police to arrest without warrant any person who could not show 
that he was employed or had adequate means of support. Thousands 
of people were arrested under this legislation which did nothing to 
stem the tide of African resistance and hence the T aw and Order 
(Maintenance) Act. Chapter 65: was passed in 1960. It was intended 
to crush once and for all Afritan nationalism. Under this legislation, 
the most draconian in the history of the country, the police were 
given sweeping powers which included powers to enter and search 
private homes 8, forbid any person from addressing any meeting 9, 
disperse any public gathering 1 , stop and/or impose any conditions oh 
the holding of public prosessions or demonstrations. 11 12 The Minister 
of Justice and Internal Affairs was given powers to ban any 
publications which he' believed to be contrary to the public interest.
Heavy penalties were imposed for the publication, printing, selling, 
distribution and/or reproduction of prohibited material. 2 The wearing 
of uniforms, displaying of placards or notices which might lead to
8 Section 61.
9 Section 13.
10 Sections 7 and 8.
11 See sections 6 and 10.
12 Section 19.
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public disorder were made criminal offences. 13 Heavy penalties were 
prescribed for people found guilty of threatening violence to others 
or property. 14 It became an offence to incite or organise a strike 
in an industry designated as an "essential service”. 15 Still further i t . 
became a serious offence to do anything which might expose 
government officers and security personnel to contempt or ridicule. 16
In 1971 the Unlawful Organisations Act, Chapter 91, was enacted and 
gave sweeping powers to the president to declare any organisation 
including political parties to be unlawful if it appeared to him that 
the activities of such organisations endangered public order. The Act 
went on to specify that virtually all national parties were unlawful. 
The authorities were given sweeping powers to declare curfews 
restricting the movement of people. 1 Taken together the Law and 
Order (Maintenance) Act, the Vagrancy Act, the Unlawful Organi­
sations Act and the Preservation of Constitutional Government Act, 
Chapter 69, amounted to a total criminalisation of any politics that 
were opposed to the settler government. Indeed, the Law and Order 
(Maintenance) Act was so brutal that the then Federal Chief Justice, 
Robert Tredgold, resigned in protest describing the Act as a "savage, 
evil, mean and dirty" law. 18
The circumscription of liberties provided for by this legislation of 
Rhodesia was made more total by the fact that the various colonial 
constitutions did not have a justiciable Bill of Rights. So abrogated 
were basic human rights that the Emergency Powers Act, Chapter 83, 
gave the government the power to declare a state of emergency and 
follow it up by making regulations of any kind to deal with the 
perceived emergency situation. In accordance with its powers under 
the Emergency Powers Act, the Rhodesian government declared a 
State of Emergency in 1965 and renewed it every six months 
thereafter until the government's demise in 1979. It made various
See section 2.
M Section 30 and 38.
15 Section 32.
16 Sections 39, 40, 41 and 44.
17 Section 53.
18 See R. Tredgold: T ift RlK'd'**’11 H at ™  mv lif e  Allen and Unwin, London, 1968.
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regulations under its powers, among which were powers to detain 
people without trial indefinitely. Under these powers, thousands of 
Africans, including the majority of today's leadership, were put in 
indefinite detention with some of them spending as many as 10 years 
in detention.
The security agencies such as the police special branch, the Central 
Intelligence Organisation and the army, acting under this array of 
security laws proceeded to display "savage resourcefulness and initiative 
by setting up murder and sabotage squads". 19 Increasingly brutal and 
savage methods were used to suppress nationalist agitation. As the 
war of liberation escalated the Rhodesian security forces resorted to 
indiscriminate measures, particularly against the rural population. 
Nearly a million peasants were moved into "protected villages" with 
the aim of isolating the rural population from the guerillas of the 
liberation war.
Curfews, sometimes lasting from 6.00 pm to 12 noon were routinely 
imposed. For example, in 1978 the following notice was published in 
respect of certain rural areas:
"As from dawn on 20th January, 1978, the following
restrictions will be imposed upon all of you...
1. Human curfew from last light to 12 o'clock daily.
2. Cattle, yolked oxen, goats and sheep curfew the last
light to 12 o'clock daily.
3. No vehicles, including bicycles or buses, to run in the 
area.
4. No person will either go on or near any high ground 
or they will be shot.
_5 ._  All dogs to be tied up 24 hours each day or they 
will be shot.
6. Cattle, sheep and goats after 12 o'clock are only to 
be herded by adults.
7. No juveniles (to the age of 16 years) will be allowed
o.ut of the kraal area at any time either day or
night, or they will be shot.
^  N. Bhebhe: T he Nationalist Struggle, 1957 — 1962', p. 82, in C.S. Banana (ed.): 
Tnnnoil and Ttemrinr- 1890 -  199ft College Press, Harare, 1989.
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8. No schools will be open.
9. All stores and grinding mills will be closed” 20
Brutal forms of torture were routinely used against opponents of the 
government. Many died under torture which became systematic and 
included beatings, electric shocks and immersion in water until the 
victim lost consciousness. 21
What is of crucial importance is that the Rhodesian state created and 
perpetuated an authoritarian and brutal political and legal order under 
which extensive repressive laws were enacted and regularly invoked by 
a brutal, fascist and overzealous police force and intelligence organi­
sation which engaged in extensive torture and murder. 22 Thus the 
culture of the Rhodesian legal system was one of extreme brutality 
in both the content and methods of law enforcement.
Because of its inherent undemocratic and racist nature, colonialisation 
hinders and positively prevents the creation and development of 
democratic institutions of government. Its repressive character inhibits 
the development of constitutions infused with basic prinkciples of 
constitutionalism and hence colonialism gives birth to undemocratic 
forms of govemmeftt which independence governments inherit and are 
called upon to democratize. t
Carve Ur
With independence in 1980, it was generally expected that the new 
Zimbabwean government would set about to perform the formidable 
tasks of creating and developing a democratic political and consti­
tutional culture imbued with basic principles of constitutionalism 23 and 
the rule of law which had been totally neglected by colonialism.
20 Quoted in J. Frederickse: None but Ourselves. Mambo Press, Gweru, 1984.
21 For descriptions of some of the torture methods which were widespread in Rhodesia, see 
Bruce M oore-King: White Man, Black Man. Baobab Books, Harare, 1983. See also three 
publications of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, namely The Man 
in the Middle (1975), Civil War m B h u fa b  (1976) and Ph~*TTilt~ The Pmpf i f a  War 
(1977). All of these three works were published by the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, London.
See generally: 7 im M i»c A  B m t  with the Past? Human 
African Watch Report, London, 1989.
23 For a discussion of the constituent elements of constitutionalism, see B.O. Nwabueze: 
C o titiitio —thm  in tin- P u y n t States, pp. 1 -20  and pp. 55-76, C  Hurst & Co., London, 
1973.
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Such expectations were natural because the articulated aim of the 
liberation struggle had been to establish a constitutional democracy 
where government would be accountable and govern only with the will 
and in the interests of the people and where state power would be 
exercised to advance these ends.
But in order to create, nurture and develop principles of con­
stitutionalism and democracy the new government had to begin by 
dismantling the authoritarian and repressive security legislation and 
institutions of the Rhodesian state which the entire leadership making 
up the new government had frequently condemned in the 1960's and 
1970's as "fascist". Indeed, the statement of declaration of policy 
issued on August 21, 1963, by ZANU, which became the ruling party 
in 1980, stated that:
"ZANU shall repeal the Unlawful Organisations Act, the 
Law and Order (Maintenance)' Act, the Preservation of 
Constitutional Government Act, the Preventive Detention 
Act, the Curatorship Act and all other repressive laws 
enacted by the white minority settler governments.”
The theme of a radical departure from the oppressive and repressive 
laws and institutions was restated in the ZANU Political Programme, 
No. 2 of 1973, which stated that:
"Broad democratic freedoms — speech, press, assembly, 
association and movement -  which have been taken away 
from the „ people of Zimbabwe by the settlers will be 
restored and guaranteed in all citizens of a free, demo­
cratic, independent and socialist Zimbabwe. All political 
detainees and restrictions will be released on the first 
possible occasion... ."
However, the reality has been largely a far cry from these promises. 
Instead of a sweeping abolition of the repressive Rhodesian security 
laws the independence period has witnessed an amazing continuity 
between the pre—and-post independence security patterns. The. 
Rhodesian linchpin of repressive-government which has the effecL of 
criminalising ordinary politics, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, 
has been retained intact.
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The Emergency Powers Act and regulations made thereunder has been 
similarly retained and in some cases broadened. The State of 
Eirtergency, introduced in 1965, has been faithfully and rituallistically 
renewed every six monthly period, thereby permitting rule—by­
executive regulation. What ever the reasons given for its almost 
religious renewal, thousands of Zimbabweans have been detained 
without trial under regulations made by virtue of its existence. Such 
detentions have been based mainly on flimsy and unsubstantiated 
information and some have been effected merely to silence the 
government's political critics. 24
Zimbabwe has thus seen a general continuation of the Rhodesian 
culture of an undemocratic and repressive legal order as exemplified 
by the retention of such laws as the Law and Order (Maintenance) 
Act and the State of Emergency. Virtually the same security 
personnel has been called upon to enforce and administer these laws.
How is the retention and extensive continued use of the "Rhodesian 
security" laws to be explained? There are various possible expla­
nations. The first is that in conditions of poverty and unfulfilled 
expectations of the benefits of independence, "state power" inevitably 
becomes a "means oPsurvival" used to create "opportunities for private 
accumulation". 25 Thus in underdeveloped economies where the 
national wealth is adequate to satisfy the needs of only a few, the 
few that hold state power will invariably use it to entrench their v 
positions of power in which they have "exclusive" access to the sparce 
resources. Thus neo—colonialism inevitably breeds undemocratic"!!™! 
repressive political and legal orders because the ruling groups must 
hold the rest of society down in order for them to continue in their 
privileged positions.
A second possible explanation is that the repressive political and legal 
culture of Rhodesia became so entrenched into the system that it 
acquired a momentum of its own and thus imposes itself upon the 
new leadership particularly within the context where that leadership
24 See generally Statement bv the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace on the 
Renewal of the State of Emergency. 25th July. 1989. and Africa Watch Report. Op.CiL, note 
22.
zs See generally H. Okoth-Ogendo: ’Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on 
an African Political -Faradok*r quoted in Reg Austin, Op.CiL, note 4, p .l.
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has retained and relied heavily on the bureaucratic and security 
personnel of Rhodesia under whose auspices the "culture of repres­
sion" originated and developed. The government's policy of recon­
ciliation resulted in the almost tofaTretentiun of "Rhodesian" police 
officers and intelligence personnel which had been responsible for 
some brutal violations of human rights abuses. 26 A third and final 
explanation could be that the geo-political circumstances of Southern 
Africa in which South Africa is engaged in destabilising its neighbours, 
dictate the continuation of repressive legislation and practices.
None of these possible explanations is adequate on its own nor 
indeed are they fully adequate even when taken together. The
matter is complex and requires a careful study of the history and 
'politics of the current political leadership in Zimbabwe which has 
failed to consistently demonstrate a commitment to the establishment, 
nurturing and broadening of democratic traditions. /indeed, the 
insistence of the leadership on putting on the political agenda of the 
country the question of introducing a one—party political system, 
which has been proved*the world over to be a recipe for political 
disaster and dictatorship/ more than confirms that the explanations for 
the continuities of Rhodesian repressive laws and practices are not to 
be sought in institutional explanations or the geo-politics and security 
considerations of the region, but requires an understanding of the 
aims, needs and mission of the political leadership.
THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
: 1
Upon the attainment of independence the new government was faced 
livith twoTmmecfiaie tasks; (the dismantling of the racist and authori-  
tarian institutions of Rhodesia including its repressive laws and legal 
order, and the creation of a single national army out of three 
antagonistic armies which had fought each other during the liberation 
war, namely the Rhodesian Army, the ZANI.A army (military wing of 
ZANU(PF) and ZIPRA (military wing of ZAPU).
26 See generally Africa Watch Return. Op.Cit, pp. 8—14, and R. Weitzer: "Continuities in t 
Politics of State Security in Zimbabwe", pp. 84-85, in M.C. Schatzberg (ed.): The Political 
Economy nf yjmhabwe Praeger Publishers, N.Y., 1984.
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We have already seen that the new rulers chose to retain virtually 
intact all the repressive laws of the past, including the State of 
Emergency which is still in force today. What now falls for discus­
sion is the manner and extent to which the post—independence 
government has used the repressive laws of "Rhodesia" and the extent 
to which it has perpetuated the Rhodesian legacy of an undemocratic 
and brutal political tradition.
Early in 1982 after discovering extensive arms caches on properties 
owned or controlled by ZAPU, the ZANU(PF)-led government of 
national reconciliation terminated its loose alliance with ZAPU and 
sacked all ZAPU ministers from the cabinet. Some former ZDPRA 
members of the newly created national army reacted by deserting 
from the army and starting a "dissident" war against the government 
which in turn responded by sending the army into the Matabeleland 
Provinces from which the dissidents operated.
It is now accepted that in its operations in Matabeleland between 
1983 and 1986 the army and other security personnel committed gross 
violations of human rights which included "wanton killings, woundings, 
beatings, burnings and rapings." 27 The operations "degenerated into 
brutality and atrodty" resulting in the "maiming and death of hundreds 
and hundreds of people who were neither dissidents nor col­
laborators." 28
According to the Report of the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, Zimbabwe: Wages of War 29, the security forces committed 
mass executions, kidnapped, detained and tortured hundreds of people.
J t '
The report of the Lawyers Committed was echoed by various other 
human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Africa Watch. 
Foreign journalists such as Peter Godwin (London Times) and Nick
27
28
29
30
Catholic Pastoral Statement, 29 March, 1983.
Ibid..
31
New York, 1986.
See pp. 28-32.
See Africa Watch Report. Op.CiL, note 22, pp. 14-20.
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Worral (The Guardian) were expelled from the country for exposing 
some of the killings perpetrated by-the-security forces.
Only a few of the security personnel that perpetrated some of the 
killings have been brought before the courts. They include four 
members of the army who murdered Lt. E. Ndlovu, his wife and two 
other people. In confirming the death sentence imposed on them, 
the Supreme Court observed that the deceased were subjected to 
torture and then "slaughtered" in the "most atrocious, cruel and cold­
blooded manner". 32 Also tried and convicted of murder were two 
members of the Special Constabulary who had murdered one Patrick 
Sibanda whom they suspected of collaborating with dissidents. On the 
facts before the court it appeared that the murder had been 
authorised by the then late Governor of the Midlands Province, 
Benson Ndemera, and the Officer-in-charge of the Police in that 
area, one inspector Wurayayi. 33 * Other cases where findings of 
human rights violation have been made by the courts include S vs. 
Slatter mid others M, Granger vs. Mimster of State 35, The State vs. 
Sfoindi , S vs. Makando and Others , Banda vs. Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others and S vs. R. Masikini. in which a security 
officer shot a man in his custody in cold blood and was convicted of 
murder. •*
Virtually all the security personnel found guilty of murder and other 
crimes in these cases were released in June 1988 alongside 75 other 
members of the security forces under a special Amnesty granted by 
the President as part of the "reconciliation” gesture following the 
achievement of political unity between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU.
See S. Chavana. C  Simanoo. G. Chiheavt and J. Gwatirera vs. The S ate. SC 42/86, p. 5. 
See I. Muishunea and L. Gaba vs. the State. SC 36/87.
HC -  H 315 -  83.
SC 83/84.
Case No. BRM 377/84.
Unreported.
HC—H —243—87.
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THE RHODESIAN LEGACY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND 
TERROR CONTINUED
From about the beginning of 1983 the people of Matabeleland 
experienced once again military and political terror hardly distinguish­
able from that inflicted on the people of Zimbabwe by the Rhodesian 
state. The Fifth Brigade, a unit of the national army trained by 
North Korean military advisers and drawing its entire membership 
from Shona speaking former ZANLA combatants was deployed in 
Matabeleland in early 1983 and:
"...in the weeks that followed, the Fifth Brigade carried 
out many killings of villagers in Matabeleland North. 
Reports indicated that often they visited villages with lists 
of ZAPU officials and sympathizers, who were singled out 
and killed. They made little attempt to engage the 
dissident's military." 39
The Fifth Brigade engaged in "brutality and atrocity" which resulted 
in the "maiming and death of hundreds and hundreds of innocent 
people who were neither dissidents nor collaborators". 40 In mid—
1983 the Fifth Brigade was withdrawn and it was not until February
1984 that it was redeployed, this time in Matabeleland South to deal 
with what the government termed "increasing infiltration” of South 
African backed dissidents. This time the authorities also imposed a 
24 hour curfew covering most of Matabeleland South. Stores and 
shops were closed, traffic stopped from entering the curfew areas, 
villagers were restricted to within 150 feet of their homes and drought 
relief food supplied to the people in the affected areas was stopped. 
A news blackout was imposed on the operations of the army in the 
curfew areas. The local population was systematically starved and 
atrocities which included mass arrests, torture, rape, killings and mass 
detentions in make-shift detention camps were committed under the 
"cover" and "darkness" of the curfew. The international community
39
40
Africa Watch Report. Op.Cit., p.16.
See Catholic Pastoral Statement, dated 29. March, 1983.
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condemned these actions and eventually the curfew was lifted and the 
Fifth Brigade withdrawn. 41
During 1984 various incidents of political violence also occurred in 
many parts of the country. In June 1984 the killing of two local 
ZANU (PF) officials by dissidents provoked some 40 000 supporters 
of the ruling party to roam the streets of Kwekwe stoning and 
burning homes of suspected opposition supporters. In some instances 
they killed their victims while the police did nothing, apparently 
having been instructed not to interfere. 42 In October 1984, the 
killing of a ruling party official and his wife in the Lower Gweru 
area led to the busing of hundreds of party youths into that area. 
They destroyed som ^4 homes, burned several stores and vehicles and 
assaulted alleged ZAPU supporters and murdered others. 43
In November 1984 the murder of Moven Ndlovu, a member of the 
ZANU (PF) Central Committee, led to yet another round of political 
violence in which gangs of party youths assaulted and/or killed a 
number of ZAPU supporters in Beitbridge. The following month 
political violence erupted in Plumtree where ZANU (PF) youths 
assaulted and harassed people, allegedly for failing to attend a ZANU 
(PF) rally. The police $beti6 once again instructed not to interfere 
in these operations. 44
In all these incidents the police, due to political interference, tragically 
failed to perform their- constitutional duty of protecting citizens and 
their property.
The period preceding the 1985 general election witnessed further 
political violence. The situation became so serious that on February 
16, the then Prime Minister felt obliged to intervene and he chastized 
his Party's youth:
See generally Zimbabwe: Wages o f war. Op.Cit., pp. 135-141, and Africa Watch Report. 
Op.Cit., pp. 15—17.
42 7 M n iu r  Wages o f War, pp. 116-117.
43 See, for example, the case of 1. Muisunga and Another vs. the State. SC 36/87 in which 
the Supreme Court found that a number of huts were set ablaze before the murder of one 
Patrick Sibanda by security personnel acting on the instructions of the Governor of the 
Province and some police officers.
44 See Zimbabwe: Wane* o f W ar. Op.CiL, pp. 117-120.
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"There appear to be some groups of youths who contrary 
to party discipline, are going about harassing innocent 
people. I would rather have no members of the party 
than members who are coerced." 45
Notwithstanding the intervention political violence continued, albeit at 
a reduced scale. 46
Although the election itself was conducted in an atmosphere of 
relative peace, the post-election period witnessed severe political 
violence. In Harare, supporters of the victorious ruling party, over 
a period of three days, stormed the houses of suspected ZAPU 
supporters, beating and evicting the occupants and destroying property 
while declaring the houses ZANU (PF) property. Some houses were 
set on fire while at least 6 people where killed. One Simo Charuka 
was gruesomely hacked to death with axes while Kenneth Mano, a 
then member of the ZAPU Central Committee, was stabbed.
Over the three days of rioting and violence the police stood by and 
took no action. Again it was alleged that they had been told not 
to interfere. It was not until about the 4th day and after ministers 
had intervened that the police started to disperse the violent crowds 
of party youths and women.
Post-election violence also occurred in Bindura, Kwekwe, Zhombe, 
Ntobe and Lower Gweru where homes and granaries were torched 
and scores of people assaulted. 47 In Kwekwe, apart from terrorizing 
their political opponents and burning their homes, a mob of sup­
porters of the ruling party demanded that the police "surrender" to 
them a suspected member of ZAPU whom they proceeded to murder 
after the police had handed him over to them. Thus a—partnn who 
'had sought police protection in a police station was handed over by! 
(the police, a body constitutionally mandated to protect lives, to a motv 
who murdered him.
International Herald Tribune. March 9, 1985.
See Wages of War, Op.CSL, pp. 124-126 for details of some examples of the violence 
and police and/or army harassment and intimidation.
n»L, pp. 126-132.
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During 1985 scores of people “disappeared" after being picked up by 
persons driving government vehicles and they have not been heard 
from since. All the available evidence points to the distinct possibility 
that they were kidnapped by government security personnel who must 
have murdered them thereafter. Efforts through the courts to have 
the government produce or admit that they were murdered by security 
personnel have been unsuccessful. 48 49
The practice and perpetuation of all this political violence is important 
because it has demonstrated the virtual total absence of a culture of 
democracy embracing tolerance of opposing views as expressed through 
a multi-party democracy. What is even worse is that the mass 
"mobs" appear to have received express and/or tacit encouragement 
from the political leadership in their "assassination" of multi-party 
democracy in Zimbabwe. Worse still is the behaviour of law 
enforcement agencies who have seemed disinterested in upholding the 
rule of law. The victims of all these acts have not been afforded 
the protection of law, a right enshrined in the Constitution of the 
country.
The current political leadership, instead of coming out in defence of
democracy and attempting * to broaden the theory and practice of
democracy, has in fact behaved in a fashion that has tended to
constrain and inhibit the emergence of a democratic culture within the 
country's body politic. For example, in pre-election speeches in
1985 the then Prime Minister issued a series of thinly veiled threats 
to those who contemplated voting for the opposition. He asked a
rally in Bulawayo: "Where will we be tomorrow? Is it war or is it 
peace? Let the people of Matabeleland answer this question."
48 See generally Zimbabwe: Wanes of War. Op.CiU pp. 59-67, and Africa Watch Report. 
Op.Cit., pp. 26-30.
49 The Herald. June 22, 1985 and also The Chronicle of the same date. See also the 
remarks of Enos Nkala, then powerful member of government, in The Herald. 19 September, 
1985, and The Chronicle-  23 August, 1985
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In the 1990 election campaign the P re se n t said in Hwange:
"We are saddened that there are others who want us 
divided. But people must not listen to small, petty little 
ants which we can crush."
Very few of the persons responsible for the violent destruction of 
properties, assaults and murders have been prosecuted by the 
authorities. The failure to punish the culprits, together with police 
inaction in the face of clear violations of the law, tends to demon­
strate that the government has not shown itself to be committed to 
fully upholding the democratic foundations of the country's consti­
tution, which enshrines multi-party democracy.
The government has also frequently resorted to the detention of its 
political opponents and hence has extensively used the powers of 
preventive detention given to it by regulations made by virtue of the 
continued existence of the state of emergency. Hundreds of people 
have been routinely detained without trial under the permissive 
Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations 
Statutory instrument, 435 of 1983 whose sections 21 and 53 empower 
police officers ^ o detain persons up to a maximum of 30 days whom 
they believe to be a risk to state security or public order. Section 
17 empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to order the indefinite 
detention of any persons if he/she believes that the detention is 
"expedient in the interests of public safety or public order".
In 1985 the government extensively used these powers to detain its 
political opponents who w^ere members of ZAPU. Most of the 
ZAPU members of Parliament were detained together with virtually 
all the black members of the Bulawayo City Council, including the 
Mayor.
Eight high-ranking national army officers who where former ZIPRA 
combatants wpere also detained joining their war-time commanders 
Dumiso Dabengwa and the late Lookout Masuku who had been in 
detention since their acquittal on treason charges in 1983. *
50
51
The Sunday Mail. 11 March, 1990.
See generally i h p  nf  War. Op.CSt., pp. 69-88.
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Hundreds of other rank and file members of ZAPU were also 
detained and many of these appear to have been subjected to various 
forms of torture while they were in custody. The methods of torture 
have included "beatings with sticks, clubs, rifle butts, raw hide whips 
(known as sjamboks), tire irons, fan belts and rubber hoses, often on 
the soles of the feet, electric shocks and perhaps most common, a 
form of suffocation by submerging the victim's head in a canvas sack 
filled with water". 5 The courts have made judicial findings of 
torture in several cases which include the cases of H. Slatter and 
Others. Wally Stattaford. Granger. Abenico Sibludi. Odile Harrington. 
S. Nhari and Others and Joseph Makando and Others.
In the general election of 1985 ZAPU won all the seats in the 
Matabeleland Provinces notwithstanding the fact that the ruling party 
had used a variety of coercive tactics to have the people of Mata­
beleland join the ruling party. People had been harassed and forced 
to buy membership cards of ZANU (PF). ZAPU offices were closed 
and the party prohibited from holding meetings. The post—election'* 
ineriod saw an intensification of these tactics which must hare] 
/significantly contributed to the ZAPU leadership's desire to unite w{t)j > 
ZANU (PF) at any cost, /fhe excuse used to justify the heavy 
handed treatment of ZAPU *and its^~sapporters- 
SPUmuml. the unlawfulJa5ivities~5f dissiaents mast of whom claimed 
to~~fight~in thfi name of the party. In this context there can be little 
doubt that ZAPU was "hammered" into the unity agreement of 
December 22, 1987.
The majority of the above discussed violations of human rights and 
the accompanying stifling of democracy are associated with the 
dissident problem with which the government had to grapple. Since 
the suppression and harassment of ZAPU was said to be founded on 
that party's alleged sponsorship of dissidents, it was expected that the 
achievement of political unity between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU 
together with the accompanying "surrender" of all dissidents would 
have brought to an end political detentions, intolerance of criticism 
and general repressive political practices which had been perpetrated 
in the name of dealing with dissidence. However, this has not been 
so. «rDn the contrary, political detentions, harassment of opposition *53
Ibid., p. 89. See also p. 90-110.
53 See generally Africa Watch Report. Op.Cit., pp. 69-88.
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.parties and intolerance of criticism have continued. It is important 
to highlight some of the manifestations of anti-democratic practices 
that have characterised the post—unity period. The continuation of 
these practices in the post-dissident period suggests that the heavy 
handed actions against ZAPU and its supporters may have been 
motivated, not only by a desire to wipe out banditry, but also by the 
leadership's lack of commitment to the practice of multi-party 
democracy and general intolerance of criticism and opposition. In 
other words, the current political leadership appears to have no desire 
to build aiid consolidate a culture or tradition of democracy em­
bracing an acceptance that no single party or group of individuals 
can hold a monopoly of all ideas on governance.
THE POST-UNITY PERIOD
On December 22, 1987, the leaders of ZANU (PF) and PF (ZAPU) 
signed a unity agreement under which the two political parties agreed 
to unite under one political party to be called ZANU (PF). 
Thereafter the "dissidents" who had fought in the name of PF 
(ZAPU) were granted a political amnesty in terms of Section 31 (1) 
of the Constitution. All of them took advantage of the free pardon 
and reported to the police. With their surrender peace returned to 
Matabeleland and affected parts of the Midlands provinces. 54 The 
political "persecution" of ZAPU and its supporters similarly came to 
an end as the two parties merged. A new political climate in which 
various sectors of society felt released from the stifling political 
tensions of the previous years was ushered in. The new atmosphere 
of freedom created new demands for the practice of democracy and 
allowed various sectors to demand freedom of expression and 
government accountability.
For a fuller dicussion of the end of the ZANU—ZAPU divisions, see Ncube, Welshman: 
"The Post—Unity Period: Developments, Benefits and Problems", note 56, infra.
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STUDENT ACTIVISM AND THE CLOSURE OF THE 
UNIVERSITY
On September 28, 1988, the students of the University of Zimbabwe, 
and the Harare Polytechnic College attempted to hold a demon­
stration in downtown Harare. Under the Law and Order (Main­
tenance) Act all processions and demonstrations require the permission 
of the police. The students' application for permission to stage the 
demonstration in the city condemning corruption in government was 
denied by the authorities, who ruled that the students could only 
demonstrate within their campuses. The students published "The 
Anti-Corruption Document", in which they declared that their 
demonstration was in support of the President's fight against corrup­
tion, and in "uncompromising, strident and radical student tones" , 
they castigated alleged abuse of power and corruption in the govern­
ment.
When the students sought to defy the ruling to demonstrate only in 
their campuses and attempted to march into town, the reaction of the 
authorities was extremely har£h. The police forcefully broke-up the 
intended demonstration, randomly assaulting and teargassing students 
and their halls of residence. Scores of students were injured during 
the violence.
In the aftermath of the demonstration the Minister of Home Affairs, 
Moven Mahachi, accused the University of being a potential source 
of destabilisation and claimed that the students' demonstration had 
been incited by subversive lecturers. The authorities followed this by 
a series of harsh and authoritarian acts which included detention and 
threats of detention against students and academics. Four lecturers, 
a bizarre mix of marxists and right wingers, were dramatically 
arraigned before the courts after normal working hours only for the 
charges to be withdrawn within 48 hours. They had been charged 
with incitement to public violence based on allegations that they were 
allegedly involved in organising the student demonstration. So bizarre 
was the mix of left and right that the authorities must have been 
embarrassed.
Austin, R.H.F.: "Neo-Colonialism, Corruption and Cressidas: The Sandura Commission of 
Inquiry into the Distribution of Motor Vehicles*, (Unpublished), p. 6.
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S.B.O. Gutto, an articulate marxist Kenyan law lecturer in the Faculty 
. o f Law was arbitrarily deported on 48 hours notice under the 
{ provisions of The Immigration Act, No. 18 of 1979, which allow the 
\ Minister of Home Affairs to order the deportation of a person 
without being obliged to give reasons therefor/. TTys draconian lav^ 
was enacted by the Smith regime during the colonial period and 
represents yet another continuity of the Rhodesian legacy of repressive 
legislation which has been readily used. No official reasons were 
given for Gutto's deportation although the insinuations were that he 
had interfered in Zimbabwe's politics through alleged involvement in 
the student demonstrations. Within the 48 hours his colleagues at 
the Faculty of Law had to secretly drive him to the Zambian border 
and into Zambia as it was understood that if he attempted to leave 
through the national airports his temporary Zimbabwean travel 
document (his Kenyan passport had expired and the Kenyan authori­
ties had refused to renew it) would be seized. No airline other them 
Kenyan airlaines would thereafter take him and hence he would have 
been effectively deported to Kenya, his country of origin, from which 
he was a political exile. 56 57
In the meantime the government summarily withdrew the grants and 
loans made by the state to members of the Students Representative 
Council (SRC) who had organised the anti—corruption demonstration. 
The then Minister of Higher Education, Dzingai Mutumbuka, publicly 
scolded them for "irresponsibility and indiscipline" and demanded that 
they publicly apologise before their grants could be restored. They 
eventually apologized and their grants/loans were thereafter restored.
Ironically, two months after extracting the apology from the, students, 
Minister' Mutumbuka was being publicly castigated by the_ Sandura 
Commission of Inquiry into the Distribution of Motoi^Vehicles by 
Willowvale Motor Industries. He was described as-"a very unsatisfac­
tory witness...who was belligerent and hostile to the Commission...(and 
who had) Tied while testifying under oath...". 58
See generally, Ibid., pp. 6 -7 .
57 For further details on this events, see Ncube: T he Post—Unity Period: Developments, 
Benefits and Problems’ in Turmoil and Tferariiy edited by CS. Banana, O p.C it at pp. 324- 
329, and Africa Watch Report. Op.CiL, at pp. 60-61.
58 See pp. 77-78 of the Commission R eport See also R.H.F. Austin, note 55 at p. 8.
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In June, 1989, o ii of the four lecturers who had been brought before 
the courts on allegations of inciting public violence in October 1988, 
Kempton Makamure, was arrested and detained for seven days and 
was not given any reasons for his detention. It was understood that 
the authorities had felt offended by a radio interview he gave to the 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation criticizing the government's new 
investment code which liberalised the repatriation of profits made by 
foreign investors. 59
In July, 1989, students of the University of Zimbabwe boycotted 
classes in protest against police denial of their application to demon­
strate against certain government policies. Sections of government and 
the media condemned the students for being unpatriotic in that they 
had boycotted classes on a day when the nation was burying William 
Ndangana, who had been declared a national hero. The acting 
Minister of Higher Education, Fay Chung, condemned the students, 
maintaining that their class boycott showed "not only bad taste, but 
also their anti—patriotic and anti—nationalistic nature". In early 
AuguitT 1989, Joshua Nkomo bad a dully reception from students on 
campus when he came to address them together with Fay Chung. 
He was not only subjected to severe questioning on a wide range of 
issues, but was often heckled and booed in response to some of his 
answers. During the stormy debate Fay Chung accused the students 
of being a bunch of hooligans and Joshua Nkomo lost his temper 
and snapped, "the best thing is to close this university and ask you 
to re-apply". 61 The Herald took up his pint in its editorial of 
August 15th, 1989, and suggested that the university be closed.
Answering questions in Parliament on August 17th, 1989, Minister Fay 
Chung accused students of being "drunkards and megalomaniacs’1 who 
"seemed to get their whole message front~RaaicTTrutir.
Since September 29, 1988, the police repeatedly, came to the university 
campus to stop planned meetings of students-which were regarded as
See generally Africa Watch Report. Op.CiL, pp. 60-61. 
See The Herald, 1 July, 1989.
The Herald. 14 August, 1989.
See The Hansard. 17 August, 1989.
political. On virtually all such occasions they used excessive force to 
suppress the meetings. On September 29th, 1989, they once again 
came on campus, this time to stop a seminar organised by students 
to mark the first anniversary of their anti-corruption demonstration.
They forcefully stopped the seminar and occupied the campus for the 
greater part of the night of 29 September. On 2 October the SRC 
issued a statement under the name of its President Arthur 
Mutambara. The statement in uncompromising, tough and angry 
language accused the government of violating academic freedom and 
the police of "harrassing", "terrorizing”, "clobbering" and "wantonly 
brutalizing" students of the night of 29 September, 1989. The police 
action was categorised as "state terrorism at its worst" and comparable 
to the brutal methods of the apartheid regime of South Africa.
Government's reaction to the statement was harsh. In the early 
hours of 4 October, fully armed police came onto campus and 
arrested Arthur Mutambara and his secretary—general Enoch Chik— 
weche. The same morning, as the news of the arrest spread, the 
remaining students reacted by boycotting classes and demanding the 
release of their leaders. During the class boycott police came onto 
campus and in the ensuing violence a group of students stoned and 
attempted to set on fire the Vice-Chancellor's government supplied 
Mercedes Benz car. For several hours the police displayed severe 
brutality in handling the students. They teargassed their halls of 
residence, assaulted them and made a make-shift detention camp just 
outside the main gate of the University.
The Vice-Chancellor after consultation with the President and other 
authorities decided to order the closure of the University. 63 The 
Zimbabwe Congress' of Trade Unions (ZCl'U), under the name of its 
secretary—general Morgan Tsvangjrai, issued a press statement 
condemning the closure of the University and blaming "first..the 
Vice-Chancellor himself and his administration for not taking the 
necessary measures...to prevent the police from perpetrating a series 
of successive raids of the campus" and secondly the government for 
"unleashing—hundreds of heavily armed riot police details onto a 
young, unarmed student population".
See Parade. November, 1989, Motn. October, 1989, and The Financial Gazette. 6 October, 
1989. See generally Ncube, note S3, at pp. 324-328.
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The statement went on to observe:
"The enthusiasm and zeal with which the police authorities 
have dealt with the students is quite interesting, and is 
hardly demonstrated in other worthy situations, for instance 
in 1985 when some politically motivated thugs stoned 
innocent people's homes, destroying their property and 
even evicting them... ."
The statement concluded that the university events were "only part of 
the general trend of events and developments...(which are) a clear 
manifestation of rising state repression...".
Again government's reaction to the ZCTU statement was swift and 
harsh. On the morning of 6 October Tsvangjfai experienced the 
"rising state repression" he had described in his statement. That 
morning the CIO arrested him and took him barefoot and handcuffed 
to his office, which was then searched. 64 He was denied access to 
his lawyers until 11 October, 1989, when the High Court ordered the 
authorities to allow him such access. A few days later, after he had 
been given unsatisfactory reasons for his detention, the High Court 
ruled his continued detention unlawful and ordered his immediate 
release. He was nominally released only to be re-arrested and re— 
^detained almost immediately on fresh grounds which alleged him to 
be a South African agent.
The new detention order was ruled a few days later to be still 
unlawful by the High Court, which again ordered that Tsvangirai be 
released. Yet again the authorities "released" him only to re—detain 
him almost immediately. He was eventually released in November, 
1989, after spending just over a month in detention. 65
After the closure of the University the remaining 13 members of the 
Student's Representative Council .(SRC) voluntarily handed themselves
See Africa Watch Report. Op.CSt., p. 64. 
See Ncube, Op.CSt-, Note 53 at p. 327.
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to the police, courageously maintaining that they stood bg the SRC 
statement issued by their President on 2 October, 1989.
On 13 October, the High Court ruled that the detention orders of 
the SRC President and his secretary-general under the Emergency 
Powers Regulations were unlawful. The authorities immediately 
transferred them to ordinary remand prison on charges of publishing 
and possessing a subversive document. * 67
The other 13 members of the SRC were also held as ordinary 
remand prisoners on the same charges. Upon the students applying 
for bail, the Minister of Home Affairs, acting in terms of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 65, issued a ministerial 
certificate barring the granting of bail. 68 69 The students applied to 
the High Court to have the certificate nullified and the High Court 
in granting their application held, inter alia, that the Ministers decision 
to issue the certificate on the purported basis that the granting of 
bail would prejudice the administration of justice, was in the 
circumstances irrational. The students were thereafter released 
from custody on bail.
In the meantime the University had been temporarily re-opened to 
allow students to write their end of year examinations. It has since 
been decided that the University would be re—opened on 23 April, 
1990, about a month after independent Zimbabwe's second general 
election.
What emerges from the university saga is that the government has 
increasingly demonstrated itself to be intolerant of \dewsjthat contra­
dict the official ones and that the state easily rlpstis to repressive 
and disproportionate measures in dealing with its perceived opponents.
See The Chronicle. 13 October, 1989, for details of the statement they handed to the 
police upon their arrest
67 See The Herald. 14 October, 1989.
68 See The Herald. 15 October, 1989.
69 Mutambara & Others vs. Minister of Home Affairs. H H -231-89.
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The trend towards greater intolerance and repression was vividly 
captured by The Financial Gazette of 13 October, 1989, which pointed 
out that:
"The closure of the university and the arrests of the 
Students Representative Council members, the arrest of 
ZCTU secretary-general for criticising that decision, and 
the detention of ZUM party officials engaged in elec­
tioneering are symptoms of a government that is unsure of 
itself and certainly unsure of how to cope with some 
pointed criticism of its policies and actions... The govern­
ment should allow criticism even if harshly worded, for this 
is the expression of democracy for which the liberation 
struggle was fought... Repressive action is not the correct 
or effective answer to criticism."
OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE 1990 GENERAL AND 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
During 1988 Edgar Tekere, the then ZANU (PF) MP for Mutare 
Urban, intensified his crusade against what he saw as increasing 
corruption in government and increasing state repression. At press 
conferences, in Parliament and other fora he accused Ministers of 
badly advising the President and of being corrupt He alleged that 
they had "chewed up" the Leadership Code of the party which 
restricts the leadership from owning properties in excess of those 
fixed. He alleged that democracy in Zimbabwe was in the "intensive 
care unit" and that the introduction of one—party rule, favoured by 
ZANU (PF), would bring about its death. Finally, he attacked the 
President himself, accusing him of being the protector of the corrupt. 
He called on the party to change its top leadership.
The Party eventually called on him to substantiate his allegations at 
a regular Central Committee meeting of the Party. He allegedly 
failed to substantiate and prove his allegations and the President 
moved a motion that he be expelled from the Party. The motion
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was carried and Tekere became the first person to be expelled from 
the ZANU (PF).
After some months in the political wilderness Tekere formed his own 
political Party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). The govern­
ment-controlled press vilified the new party and has since carried out 
a campaign of slander against it. 70 The political leadership of 
ZANU (PF) condemned the formation of ZUM as a negation of 
national unity and a recipe for the re-emergence of the political 
strife that existed when ZAPU was in the opposition.
ZUM was denied permission to hold political rallies and contested the 
Dzivarasekwa by-electiofl in July, 1989, without having held a single 
rally 71, and that notwithstanding still obtained 30 % of the total 
votes cast. In Bulawayo, a ZUM official was prosecuted and 
convicted for holding meetings without permission. The government 
controlled daily newspapers refused to accept ZUM 's paid-for 
advertisements for its rallies. It would appear that the same tactics 
of harassment, denial of authority to hold party meetings and 
detentions which were used against ZAPU, are now being used 
against ZUM.
At the legal plane the povernm ent invoked ite p">«/prc nnrfw  th<» ctate 
of emergency to arrest and detain for short periods ZUM officials, 
involved in electioneering as _rhe—country prepared—tnr the. .1 WU~ 
General_ and Presidential, elections. This practice appears to have 
been ^ developed as a tactic of harassing and disrupting the oppo­
sition's election campaign.
More disturbing, however, were ^jyents taking place at the extra- 
legal plane where the ruling party engaged in numerous anti­
democratic p ra rtiV e g  in  th o  m a n a g e m e n t  anH pinninp of its election 
campaign. Party youths and women extensively harassed, intimidated 
and often assaulted members and candidates oj opposition parties. 
Prominent examples include the severe assault on the ZUM candidate 
for Kariba, Mr. Peter Muparanji, who appears to have been assaulted
See, for example, The Herald of 8 and 20 May, 1989, and The Sunday Mail of 25 June 
and 2 July, 1989.
See Africa Watch Report, pp. 58-59.
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by youths at the incitement of the Mayor of Chinhoyi, Mr. Mayford, 
Mawere, who is also a prominent member of the ruling pai&. 
Another example is the near fatal shooting of ZUM candidate for 
Gweru Central, Mr. Patrick Kombayi, who was shot in the presence 
of uniformed policemen after serious violent clashes between ZANU 
(PF) and ZUM youths outside his shopping complex in Ridgemont, 
Gweru. Even another example is the severe assault on ZUM's 
director of elections, Jerry Nyambuya in Gweru, by armed gunmen 
suspected to be members of the Central Intelligence Operation.
The intimidation and harassment was so serious that several ZUM 
candidates contesting the elections resigned from that Party to rejoin 
the ruling party. A clear example is Evans Svosve, who resigned 
from ZUM after ZANU (PF) youths looted his carpentry shop in 
Mufakose and kept vigil outside his record shop in the Madya mini­
market daring anybody to shop from it. 72
The pre-election intimidation and violence became so serious that the 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe issued an on 
eve-of-poll statement "calling into question the freedom and fairness 
of the general election". The statement placed the bulk of the 
responsibility for the violence and prevailing climate of fear on ZANU 
(PF) which was held responsible for the near fatal shooting of 
Kombayi.
The undemocratic and intolerant tendencies of the ruling party were 
further highlighted as the nation watched in disbelief and dismay 
ruling party advert broadcast on national television. The advert
broadcast the squealing of tyres and the smashing impact of glass and 
metal of a car accident, followed by a voice coldly warning: "This 
is one way to die. Another is to vote for ZUM.~ D on 't commit 
suicide...vote ZANU (PF)".
Even though the actual balloting was conducted without violent, 
almost immediately after the election results were announced, ZANU 
(PF) youths and women unleashed violence on persons suspected of 
having voted for ZUM. In Gweru, Karoi, Kwekwe and Chegutu 
gangs of youths terrorized and assaulted persons believed to be 
members of ZUM. Demonstrations calling for the dismissal from 
•
See generally The Herald. 27 March, 1990.
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their employment of persons who had stood as ZUM candidates in 
various constituencies were organised and held by the ruling party's 
Women and Youth Leagues. These demonstrations also called for 
the "expulsion" from the relevant constituencies of ZUM candidates 
and members.
Unlike in 1985 some of the perpetrators of the election violence of 
1990 are being brought before the courts for trial 73 *and so far one 
of the ZANU (PF) youths, involved in assaulting persons suspected 
to be members of ZUM in Karoi, has beeirfepovicted by the courts. 
Of extreme concern, however, are the remarks of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nathan Shamuyarira, concerning these cases. He 
is reported, in The Herald , as having said that the Party was to 
pay the fine imposed on the youth by the court and also that the 
government and the party were in full support of the actions of its 
youth in Karoi.
Taken together all these events surrounding the 1990 general elections 
calls into serious question the ruling party's commitment to demo­
cracy and the rule of law.
K
CONCLUSION
The continuities of the repressive security laws and practices of 
Rhodesia into Zimbabwe has been staggering. The legal context has 
encouraged a "high level of authoritarianism and government unac— 
countability under the rubric "security" and "Emergency Powers"". 75 
The continuation of the State of Emergency, under whose rubric most 
of the violations of the basic elements of democracy have taken 
place, has increasingly become difficult to justify while the almost 25 
years of Emergency rule means that virtually none of the present 
security officials have worked without the "comfort and reassurance of
See Moto. June, 1990.
75
The Herald. 16 July, 1990.
Austin, R.H.F., OpiCSt. note 4, at p. 6.
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Emergency Powers alongside their truncheon or firearm". 76 The 
important point is that the same callous cruelties practiced by security 
officials in Rhodesia can be and are still hidden behind these 
"trademarks of tyranny".
The challenges of democratic government require the total dismantling 
of Rhodesia's "trademarks of tyranny" and a concerted effort towards 
the creation of a culture of political tolerance. Placing the question 
of one-party rule on the political agenda of the country would 
certainly not assist towards that process.
The one-party politcal system has been demonstrated by the 
experiences of all countries which have introduced it to be a recipe 
for dictatorship and tyranny. Why anyone could believe Zimbabwe 
would be an exception is mind-boggling. It is accordingly incumbent 
upon all democratic forces in Zimbabwe to resist all attempts towards 
the constitutionalisation of a one-party political system, particularly 
within the context of the fact that the political leadership which seeks 
to introduce it has not demonstrated itself to be imbued with 
principles of democratic governments, as we have sought to show in 
this article.
76 Ibid., p. 7.
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rSTATE SECU RITY , T H E  R U L E  O F  LAW  AND 
POLITICS O F  REPRESSIO N  IN ZIM BABW E
Zimbabwe has often been portrayed as an exception to the 
gloomy picture of African politics, where the culture of 
democracy and government accountability is conspicuous by 
its absence.
There have, however, been disturbing trends which have 
tended to suggest that sooner or later Zimbabwe will 
adopt a system of political repression found in other 
African countries. Critical voices have been raised to 
protect the multi-party system, as entrenched in the 
.Lancaster House constitution, against the expressed inten­
tions of the ruling party to introduce a one-party political 
system.
If is the object of this paper to discuss and highlight some 
of these trends vdth a view to demonstrating that behind 
the facade of "o^jstitutionalism and democracy" which has 
been created of the Zimbabwean state in fact lies a bmtal 
legal system as wellj£s serious violations of basic demo­
cratic rights, human frights and the rule of law. Hence 
the description of these treate. as ''politics of repression". 
For Zimbabwe to establistofflttreal system of constitutional 
democracy, according to^ffirehman Ncube, a com; iete 
renunciation of. the politics8®repression is needed.
Division for N orth/South f^B versity  C ooperation  
• Centre for Developm ent a g f .ihc Environment 
\  University 9 m s I&
P.O.Box jW S  
0316 O staT i
ISSN 0333-1563
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
Institute o f 
Development Studies
